Volume 70
Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 70,
1965-1966
3-1-1966

Commonwealth v. Glen Alden Corp.: The Use of Equity
Jurisdiction to Enjoin Irreparable Injury
Jerry B. Silver

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Jerry B. Silver, Commonwealth v. Glen Alden Corp.: The Use of Equity Jurisdiction to Enjoin Irreparable
Injury, 70 DICK. L. REV. 430 (1966).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol70/iss3/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

COMMONWEALTH v. GLEN ALDEN CORP. : THE USE
OF EQUITY JURISDICTION TO ENJOIN
IRREPARABLE INJURY
Recently, in Commonwealth v. Glen Alden Corp.,1 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided that equity jurisdiction will not
lie when a statutory remedy has not been exhausted. The Commonwealth instituted an equity action demanding that the Glen Alden
Corporation extinguish or remove burning coal refuse piles which
were releasing noxious fumes and gases because they were adverse
to the health and well being of the residents in the area. The
Commonwealth contended that equity jurisdiction did lie even
though a statutory remedy is provided by the Air Pollution Control
Act.2 The Commonwealth contended that the act was inadequate
because it was cumbersome and time-consuming, and its pursuit
would cause irreparable injury to the public. The court denied
equity jurisdiction because the statutory remedy, which was provided, had not been pursued.3
One of the fundamental rules of equity is that relief may be
granted if the remedy at law is inadequate. 4 The remedy at law is
inadequate if the party will sustain irreparable injury by being
forced to pursue that remedy. 5 This Note attempts to define and
explain the term "irreparable injury" and to determine whether
the Glen Alden court properly denied equity jurisdiction. Before
examining the question of irreparable injury consideration must be
given to the exhaustion of remedy doctrine and its recognized exceptions.
This doctrine was established early in Pennsylvania by a statute" providing that "in all cases where a remedy is provided, or
anything directed to be done by any act or acts of assembly of this
Commonwealth, the directions of these acts shall be strictly pursued."'7 Thus, when a statutory remedy or procedure is provided,
its directions must be strictly followed."
In Glen Alden the exhaustion of remedy doctrine was held a
barrier to equitable jurisdiction. The court recognized that equity
1. 418 Pa. 57, 210 A.2d 257 (1965).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 4001-15 (1964).
3. 418 Pa. 57, 210 A.2d 257 (1965).
4. Pennsylvania State Chamber of Commerce v. Torquato, 386 Pa. 306,
125 A.2d 755 (1956); Wood v. Goldvarg, 365 Pa. 92, 74 A.2d 100 (1950).
5. Duquesne Light Co. v. Upper St. Clair Twp., 377 Pa. 323, 105 A.2d
287 (1954); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Bogert, 209 Pa. 589, 59 Atl. 100 (1904).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 156 (1952).
7. Ibid.
8. Bartron v. Northampton County, 342 Pa. 163, 19 A.2d 263 (1941);
Derry Twp. School Dist. v. Barnett Coal Co., 332 Pa. 174, 2 A.2d 758 (1938);
Ermine v. Frankel, 322 Pa. 70, 185 Atl. 269 (1936).

NOTES

Spring 1966]

has jurisdiction to enjoin a public nuisance, unless to do so would
obviate the statutory procedure provided by the legislature. There
are, however, recognized exceptions to the exhaustion of remedy
doctrine. Equity jurisdiction will lie if the constitutionality of the
statute or ordinance is challenged 9 or if pursuit of the statutory
remedy will result in "irreparable injury." 10 The type of injuries
usually regarded as irreparable are those involving interference
with the enjoyment of property, as distinguished from injury to
the property itself."
This includes nuisances directly affecting
health, 12 safety 3 and comfort, including those
involving unpleasant
4
odors, smoke, cinders, noise, and so forth.
In Pennsylvania there is an expressed statutory provision giving equity jurisdiction to restrain and enjoin a public nuisance. 15
The act gives the courts of common pleas jurisdiction and power to
prevent or restrain "the commission or continuance of acts contrary
9. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 410 Pa. 571, 190 A.2d
111 (1963); Bell Tel. Co. v. Driscoll, 343 Pa. 109, 21 A.2d 912 (1941) (equity
may enjoin an administrative agency from exercising powers not conferred
upon it or unconstitutionally conferred upon it). In two very recent Pennsylvania cases, Studio Theaters Inc. v. City of Washington, 418 Pa. 73, 209
A.2d 802 (1965) and Appeal of City of Pittsburgh, 416 Pa. 574, 209 A.2d 799
(1965), this exception to the exhaustion doctrine was again noted.
10. Pennsylvania State Chamber of Commerce v. Torquato, 386 Pa.
306, 125 A.2d 755 (1956); Duquesne Light Co. v. Upper St. Clair Twp., 377
Pa. 323, 105 A.2d 287 (1954); Wood v. Goldvarg, 365 Pa. 92, 74 A.2d 100
(1950); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Bogert, 209 Pa. 589, 59 Atl. 100 (1904).
11. See generally LAWRENCE, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 860-62 (1929).
12. See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1900) (disposing sewage
into stream); Caretti v. Broring Bldg. Co., 150 Md. 198, 132 Atl. 619 (1926)
(disposing sewage into stream); Bird v. Grand Rapids, 175 Mich. 503, 141
N.W. 890 (1913) (disposing sewage into stream); Nelson v. Swedish Cemetery Ass'n, 111 Minn. 149, 126 N.W. 723 (1910) (enjoining the building
of a cemetery); Rodenhauser v. Craven, 141 Pa. 546, 21 Atl. 774 (1891)
(enjoining operation of stable in residential area).
13. See Remsberg v. Iola Portland Cement Co., 73 Kan. 66, 84 Pac.
548 (1906) (enjoining the erection of a powder house storing dynamite);
McGregor v. Camden, 47 W. Va. 193, 34 S.E. 936 (1899) (enjoining the
erection of oil and gas well in residential area).
14. See Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 168, 106
Pac. 581 (1910) (enjoining nuisance caused by smoke and gas); Henderickson v. Standard Oil Co., 126 Md. 577, 95 Atl. 153 (1915) (enjoining
emission of gas from a factory); Harrigan v. Sinclair & Valentine Co., 85
N.J. Eq. 85, 95 Atl. 738 (1915) (enjoining emission of noxious fumes from
an ink factory); Wallace & Tiernan Co. v. United States Cutlery Co., 97 N.J.
Eq. 128 Atl. 872 (1925) (injunction against vibrations and noises from a
factory). Thus equity will intervene to protect the public from any course
of conduct which affects its health, safety or physical well-being. See
Attorney-General v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133 Mass. 361 (1882)
(restraining the drainage of a lake); Attorney-General v. Peterson, 58 N.J.
Eq. 1, 42 Atl. 749 (Ch. 1898) (enjoining pollution of a stream); Baltimore
v. Board of Health, 139 Md. 210, 115 Atl. 43 (1921) (enjoining the spreading of garbage); Pine City v. Munch, 42 Minn. 342, 44 N.W. 197 (1889)
(abating the existence of infectious swamps and ponds).
15.

PA.

STAT. ANN.

tit. 17,

§ 283 (1962).
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to law and prejudicial to the interests of the community or the
rights of the individuals."'16
The Glen Alden court did not overlook this basic equity jurisdiction to enjoin public nuisance. Relying on Collegeville Borough
v. PhiladelphiaSuburban Water Co." the court stated that if the
Air Pollution Control Act' 8 provided a remedy, equity could not
have jurisdiction. This followed even though the complaint stated
a cause of action in public nuisance, traditionally cognizable in
equity. In Collegeville the plaintiffs filed a bill in equity to enjoin
the defendant water company from erecting a dam and diverting
water from a certain stream as part of an area water conservation
project. The application to build the dam had been approved by the
Water Power and Resources Board after a hearing. Instead of taking an appeal from the decision of the Board as provided by statute, 19 plaintiffs filed a suit in equity. The supreme court denied
equity jurisdiction because the parties had failed to exhaust the
statutory remedy. 20 The court felt that the creation of the Board
deprived equity of jurisdiction over water allocation cases.
Glen Alden and Collegeville are readily distinguishable. If the
court had granted equity jurisdiction in Collegeville, it would have
prevented the conservation and equitable distribution of the waters
of the Commonwealth for the benefit of the public. For this reason the Collegeville court was reluctant to interfere. Thus the public was benefitted by the denial of equity jurisdiction. In Glen
Alden, however, the denial of equity jurisdiction did not result in a
benefit to the public. The Collegeville rationale, therefore, would
seem inapplicable to the Glen Alden situation.
The Glen Alden court also relied on Commonwealth ex rel.
Shumaker v. New York & Pennsylvania Co. Inc.21 The Commonwealth filed a bill in equity to enjoin the defendant mill operator
from discharging harmful industrial wastes into the Clarion River
which made the water unfit for public consumption or recreation.
The injunction was refused, because the Pure Streams Act 2 2 provided a remedy which had to be exhausted. The supreme court
reversed, holding that the remedy provided by the Act did not preclude equity jurisdiction, since it was merely declaratory of the
common law relating to nuisances. If the pollution of water affects public health, it becomes a nuisance which equity may enjoin. 23 The Glen Alden court concluded that Shumaker was limited
16. Ibid.
17.

377 Pa. 636, 105 A.2d 722 (1954).

18.
19.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 4001-15 (1964).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.41 (1962).

20. 377 Pa. 636, 105 A.2d 722 (1954).
21. 367 Pa. 40, 79 A.2d 439 (1951).
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1, 691.801 (1964).
23. See Commonwealth ex rel. Woods v. Soboleski, 303 Pa. 53, 153 Ati.
893 (1931); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 Atl.
386 (1924); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 240 Pa. 214, 87 Atl. 605 (1913);
Commonwealth v. Emmers, 221 Pa. 298, 70 Atl. 762 (1908).
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to those situations in which there is an express preservation of
equitable jurisdiction. This would appear to be an incorrect interpretation. The Pure Streams Act does have a section expressly
preserving existing rights and remedies 2 4 but the Shumaker court
specifically stated that even without such a provision,
...
because of the grave menace to the public interest
arising from corruption of waters affecting as it does the
health, welfare and comfort of the public . . ., we have
always refused to accept statutes outlawing pollution as
restricting
the common law right to abate stream pollu25
tion.
The Air Pollution Control Act 26 does not have any provision
expressly preserving equitable jurisdiction. It would seem that air
pollution is as much a menace to public health and welfare as is
stream pollution. Applying the Shumaker rationale to Glen Alden
it appears that the Air Pollution Control Act should not be construed as limiting the common law right to abate air pollution,
even though the statute does not expressly preserve equitable jurisdiction.
The Glen Alden court recognized that the statutory remedy
need not be followed if its pursuit would result in irreparable injury.27 It felt, however, that pursuit of the remedy provided by the
act would not result in irreparable injury to the public. The court
observed that the Commonwealth had alleged irreparable injury
solely because the statutory procedure was cumbersome and timeconsuming 2 8 but had not related such an allegation to the necessity for short circuiting the statutory procedure. The court added
that this contention would be relevant only when the difference in
time required to settle the dispute as between equity and the
statutory procedure would make the pursuit of the statutory procedure irreparably damaging.
The procedure provided by the act is indeed cumbersome. The
Commonwealth submits complaints to a regional air pollution control association 2 which has six months to investigate and report to
the Air Pollution Commission. After further consideration the commission makes a determination."
It cuuld easily be a matter of
many months before effective enforcement action could be taken.
During this period, the public would be forced to breathe the noxious fumes, causing irreparable injury to their lungs and manifest
discomfort to their sense of smell.
The dissent felt that this was clearly irreparable injury:
Time and again this Court has recognized that equity has
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 691.701 (1964).
25. 367 Pa. at 51, 79 A.2d at 445.
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 4001-15 (1964).
27. 418 Pa. at 61, 210 A.2d at 259.
28. Ibid.
29. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 4006(a) (b) (3) (1964).

24.

30.

PA. STAT.

ANN. tit. 35,

§ 4007 (1964).
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jurisdiction to enjoin the tortious use of land and to abate a
nuisance ....
I am of the opinion that the statutory remedy is inadequate and equitable relief is necessary in the
case at bar to prevent irreparable damage."
Thus, there appears in Glen Alden a definite difference of opinion
as to the adequacy of the remedy and the irreparable character of
the resulting injury.
For a remedy to be adequate it must provide such relief as
would place the injured party in a position similar to his position
before the injury occurred.3 2 For example, an injunction will be
granted to an innocent purchaser of the stock and good will of a
business to prevent the sale of the business by the sheriff under
attachments. 33 An action of trespass or replevin cannot give the
relief necessary to prevent the destruction of business good will.
Moreover, when an injury is constantly repeated requiring the
inbringing of successive legal actions, the remedy is considered
34
adequate and such injury will be prevented by an injunction.
The term "irreparable injury" cannot be precisely defined. 5
There appear, however, to be four main categories of irreparable injury. An injury is irreparable when (1) the damages which may
result from the injury cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary
standard;36 (2) from its nature or from the circumstances surrounding the injury, it cannot be adequately compensated in damages
even though there is a pecuniary standard to measure the damages;3 7 (3) there are acts which destroy or result in a serious change
of property, either physically or in the character in which it has
31. 418 Pa. at 65, 210 A.2d at 261.
32. See North v. Peters, 138 U.S. 271 (1890); Pottetti v. Clifford, 140
Conn. 252, 150 A.2d 207 (1959).
33. North v. Peters, 138 U.S. 271 (1890).
34. See Morgan v. City of Lakeland, 90 Fla. 525, 107 So. 269 (1926).
Harris v. Krekler, 113 Ind. App. 190, 46 N.E.2d 267 (1943); Wheelock v.
Noonan, 108 N.Y. 179, 15 N.E. 67 (1888) (abuse of license to pile rocks on
plaintiff's land); Ercanbrach v. Clark, 79 Utah 233, 8 P.2d 1093 (1932).
35. In Crescent City Co. v. Police Jury, 32 La. Ann. 1192 (1880) it
was said:
There are many injuries which in the very nature of things
cannot be repaired by any money consideration. Such for instance, as result from acts which outrage the feelings and wound
the sensibilities, or deprive us of objects of affection and of things,
perhaps trivial in themselves, but of inestimable value, by reason
solely of being associated with some precious memory or touching
incident of our lives. Or it may be that the maintenance of the
writ is required to preserve to us our homes, and to establish us
in a state or condition which, lost for the moment, can never be
recovered, nor the loss atoned for by money. In all this class of
cases the injunction should be maintained because the injury from
its dissolution would be irreparable.
Id. at 1194.
36. Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. Norton, 21 F. Supp. 707 (E.D. Pa. 1937);
Dastugue v. Cohen, 14 La. App. 475, 131 So. 476 (1930).
37. See Haack v. Lindsay Light & Chem. Co., 325 Ill. App. 581, 60 N.E.
2d 578 (1945).
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been held or enjoyed; 3 and (4) there are injurious acts of such
constant and frequent recurrence that no reasonable compensation
may be obtained in damages. 9
The term "irreparable injury" does not refer to the amount of
damage, but rather to the difficulty in measuring it. 40 In Crescent
City Co. v. Police Jury,41 it appeared from the plaintiff's own showing that he would not be irreparably injured because he estimated
his damages at 1,500 dollars. Hence, equity jurisdiction could not
be maintained within the first category of irreparable injury. If
a charitable organization were prevented from using its building in
the pursuit of its charitable work, irreparable injury would result.42 There would not be a loss of property or profits, but simply
the loss of its right to pursue its charitable work. Such a loss cannot
be measured by any pecuniary standard. The damage would be
merely nominal in a pecuniary sense, yet substantial
when meas43
ured by the standard of moral right and justice.
Irreparable injury incapable of measurement by any pecuniary
44
standard can arise from the breach of a personal service contract.
4
In PhiladelphiaBall Club v. Lajoie the defendant, an expert baseball player, contracted to play for the plaintiff and no one else
during the period of the contract. Lajoie violated this agreement
and the plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain him from playing
for a rival organization. The supreme court held:
Where one person agrees to render personal services to
another, which require and presuppose a special knowledge,
skill and ability in the employee, so that in case of a default
the same service could not easily be obtained from others,
38. See Kane v. Porter, 77 Cal. 257, 235 Pac. 561 (1925); Pradelt v.
Lewis, 297 Ill. 374, 130 N.E. 785 (1921); Lackoff v. Bogue, 158 Neb. 174, 62
N.W.2d 889 (1954).
39. See Heine v. Roth, 2 Alaska 416 (1905); Farley v. Gate City
Gaslight Co., 105 Ga. 323, 31 S.E. 193 (1898).
40. See Ahrent v. Sprague, 139 Ark. 416, 214 S.W. 68 (1919); Miller
v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267 (1954); Phipps v. Rogue River
Valley Canal Co., 80 Or. 175, 156 Pac. 794 (1916).
41. 32 La. Ann. 1192 (1880).
42. See Washington Home of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 281 Ill. 110,
117 N.E. 737, 741 (1917).
43. Another example in which the injury cannot be measured by
any pecuniary standard involves the possession of natural resources. In
Westmoreland & Cambria Nat'l Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 Atl. 724
(1889), a lessee in possession of leased premises and entitled to the natural
gas underlying them was granted an injunction restraining the lessor from
drilling on the leasehold. In this instance the damages likely to result
from the threatened waste would be entirely incapable of measurement
at law. Natural gas has the tendency to escape; thus there would be no
accurate way to measure the pecuniary loss suffered by the lessee. Since
there is no pecuniary standard for measuring the damages, the lessee's

injury is an irreparable one.
44.

(1902).
45.

See Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 Atl. 973
202 Pa. 20, 51 A t l . 973 (1902).
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although the affirmative specific performance of the contract is beyond the power of the court, its performance will
be negatively enforced by enjoining its breach ....
The
damages for breach of such contract cannot be estimated
with any certainty, and the employer cannot, by means of
any 46damages purchase the same service in the labor market.
In Glen Alden there was neither the prevention of a charitable
purpose nor a breach of a personal service contract. There was,
however, an injury for which damages could not be measured by
any certain pecuniary standard. The noxious fumes and gases were
a nuisance and threatened the health of the area residents, who
could not be adequately compensated for such an injury.
In Commonwealth v. Rush 47 an injunction was sought to prohibit the defendants from erecting a building on the public square
of Allegheny. This, the court held, would result in irreparable injury, since the public would be deprived of their right of way and
could not be adequately compensated. 48 The court noted the act 49
giving equity jurisdiction to abate a nuisance:
The object of the clause [in the act] was to provide adequate redress in cases where, although an action at law
was maintainable, yet the injury might be irreparable, and
it was necessary for justice to step in and prevent its being
committed. Thus if there were sufficient grounds to believe .. .that a corporation was grossly abusing its privileges . . . or any act was likely to be done for which damages could not perhaps compensate, and the legal redress
might be too tardy and inefficient, which was in the nature
of misfeasance, nuisance, waste, spoil or destruction of
property, and the act was contrary to law and injurious to
the community or individuals, a remedy is given by the
strong arm of an injunction, to stop it, or prevent its being
done. 50
Here again the principle was recognized that a tardy and inefficient
remedy at law may stimulate the exercise of equity jurisdiction.
The first category of irreparable injury limits the term to situations in which damages cannot be measured by any pecuniary
standard. 51 The definition of irreparable injury, however, is not so
46.

Id. at 216, 51 Atl. at 973, quoting from POMEROY, POMEROY'S

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS 31 (1926).

47. 14 Pa. 186 (1850).
48. Ibid.
49.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46,

§ 156 (1964).

50. 14 Pa. at 195.
51. An example of the existence of a pecuniary standard for measuring the damages is Luckenbach S.S. Co., Inc. v. Norton, 21 F. Supp.
•707 (E.D. Pa. 1937). The plaintiff sought to enjoin the United States
Employees Compensation Commission from enforcing an award of compensation made to a romplaint longshoreman, claiming that it would be
irreparably injured by the enforcement of the order since the complaintant
was insolvent. The company argued that if payment were made, and the
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narrow. There are situations in which the actual damage is capable
of being measured by a pecuniary standard, but damages could
never adequately compensate the injured party. 52 Only equity
can grant adequate relief.5
The second category of irreparable injury is illustrated by
Groves v. Key City Gas Co.5 4 The defendant gas company, which
had a monopoly in the area, contracted to furnish the plaintiff with
gas free of charge for twenty years. The court enjoined the defendant from cutting off the plaintiff's supply, holding that there
would be an irreparable injury to the plaintiff since he could not be
adequately compensated in damages. Here there was a pecuniary
standard to measure the damages, the cost of another form of
energy, but the discomfort and inconvenience could never be adequately redressed. 55
In Duquesne Light Co. v. Upper St. Clair Twp.56 the light company, which was building a new transmission line, sought to enjoin
the enforcement of an ordinance of defendant-township. If this
ordinance were enforced, it would have imposed a large fine on
each piece of property where work was performed in violation of it.
The township claimed that the zoning statute under which the ordi57
nance wass adopted provided the exclusive remedy. This statute
provided a slow procedure replete with delays for proper notice and
appeal. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the injunction
because pursuit of the statutory remedy would have resulted in
irreparable- injury. The court noted that if the township's ordinance were enforced, the penalty could have cost the light company three thousand dollars for each day that the construction work
continued. This amount could swell very quickly to an unreasonable sum. If the company did not have the transmission lines installed within three months, they would have had to operate at a
substantial daily loss until the lines were completed. Thus, there
was a pecuniary standard to measure the damages incurred by the
company, but the court looked beyond the pecuniary considerations
into the surrounding circumstances. If the lines were not completed the light company would have been forced to use less efficient equipment and to curtail services to its customers. This
could have resulted in loss of good will, which could not have been
order set aside on final hearing, they would be unable to recover the sum.
The court denied. the injunction holding. that the damages were measurable
by plaintiff's outlay and therefore a pecuniary standard existed.
52. See Groves v. Key City Gas Co., 83 Iowa 714, 50 N.W. 283 (1891);
City of Lake Charles v. Lake Charles Ry., 144 La. 217, 80 So. 260 (1918).

53.

Ibid.

54.

83 Iowa 714, 50 N.W. 283 (1891).

.55.

In City of Lake Charles v. Lake Charles Ry., 144 La. 217, 80 So.
the court held that -an irreparable injury would result when
there was no practical means of compensating the injured parties, even
though :a pecuniary standard existed for measuring the damages.
260 (1918)
56.
57.

377 Pa. 323, 105 A.2d 287 (1954).
PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 53, § 19092.3107 (1957).
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adequately compensated in damages. Thus, the court realized that
the time-consuming statutory procedure could cause the plaintiff
irreparable injury. In contrast, the Glen Alden court felt that such
consideration was not even relevant.
Shipley v. Ritter58 illustrates the third category of irreparable
injury. An injunction was granted to prevent the destruction of
ornamental trees which also sheltered plaintiff's home from storms
and the sun. Here the injury would have been irreparable since it
would have destroyed and seriously changed the character in which
the property had previously been held and enjoyed by the plaintiff.59
This type of irreparable injury can arise from an intentional
encroachment on the land of an adjoining owner.6 0 In Pradelt v.
Lewis,61 there was an encroachment on the plaintiff's land by the
defendant's building which leaned against and projected over the
plaintiff's building. The court granted an injunction compelling
removal of the defendant's building. The defendant's brick wall
could have eventually fallen against the plaintiff's building. Such
a situation resulted in great disturbance and annoyance to the
plaintiff. Thus, there was an irreparable injury since the plaintiff
62
could not use and enjoy his property as he previously held it.
Equitable relief was also granted in Wood v. Goldvarg 3 where
the construction of a three story apartment house on land adjacent
to plaintiff's residence was enjoined. Plaintiff had withdrawn his
64
opposition to the zoning change that permitted the apartment,
under an agreement that defendant would construct only a duplex. 65 The court said:
It would be absurd to compel plaintiffs, under the circumstances here involved, to proceed at law. . . for the obvious
reason that while such litigation was in progress, defendants building would be erected and as a result irreparable
58. 7 Md. 408 (1855).
59. This would also extend to a situation in which a lessee who owned
the timber on his land to the extent of estovers would suffer irreparable
injury by the removal of this timber. In Hood v. Foster, 194 Miss. 812, 13
So.2d 652 (1943), the county sold the merchantable timber on the lessee's
land to Hood. The court enjoined Hood from removing and cutting this

timber since the lessee, owner of estovers, would suffer irreparable injury.

If the timber were allowed to be removed, it would destroy and seriously
change the property as it had been previously held and enjoyed. See also
Kane v. Porter, 77 Cal. 257, 235 Pac. 561 (1925) (irreparable injury result-

ing from interference with easement across another land).
60.
61.

Pradelt v. Lewis, 297 Ill. 374, 130 N.E. 785 (1921).
297 Ill. 374, 130 N.E. 785 (1921).

62.

See cases cited note 38 supra.

63.
64.

365 Pa. 92, 74 A.2d 100 (1950).
The court pointed out that if the plaintiffs had continued their

objections, the re-zoning would not have been accomplished.

65. In negotiating with the plaintiffs and in petitioning the zoning
board, Goldvarg neither sought nor expected to obtain permission to build

anything but a double duplex apartment.
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damages would be sustained by plaintiffs. 66
Although damages could have compensated the loss in market value
of their property, plaintiffs could not have been adequately compensated for their diminished enjoyment. Noxious fumes should
not be considered any less annoying or disturbing to the enjoyment
of property than the disturbances in these cases. The injury therefrom is just as irreparable. The court in Lead v. Inch67 enjoined
the operation of a horse stable in a thickly residential area because
of the noxious fumes. In contrast to Glen Alden, the Lead
court felt that offensive odors indicated an injury sufficiently irreparable in character to warrant equity jurisdiction.
The fourth category of irreparable injury includes those situations in which a multiplicity of suits would be required to insure
relief. The injury is in the nature of a continuing trespass. Injunctions have been granted to enjoin the operation of steam engines too near the plaintiff's home,68 or to enjoin the erection of a
privy too close to an adjoining property owner, 69 or to enjoin the
emission of chemical gases from a plant onto the plaintiff's resi70
dence.
It is suggested that before any future decisions are made relying on Glen Alden the court should carefully consider the characteristics of an irreparable injury. In Glen Alden the court rigidly
applied the exhaustion of remedy doctrine, fully aware that it
should not be applied if pursuit of the statutory remedy will result
in irreparable injury. It appears that there was irreparable injury
in Glen Alden. Denial of equity jurisdiction seems unjust. The
court refused to act in consonance with an established policy of
the Commonwealth to protect the public from irreparable injury.
To induce equity to refuse its aid to a suitor, it is not
sufficient that he may have some remedy at law. An existing remedy at law to induce equity to decline the exercise
of its jurisdiction in favor of a suitor must be an adequate
and complete one. And when from the nature and complications of a given case, its justice can best be reached, by
means of the flexible machinery of a court of equity, in
short where a full, perfect and complete remedy cannot be
afforded at law,
equity extends its jurisdiction in further71
ance of justice.
JERRY

B. SnmvER

66.
67.

365 Pa. at 95, 74 A.2d at 102.
116 Minn. 467, 134 N.W. 218 (1912).
68. Melvin v. E.B. & A.L. Stone Co., 7 Cal. App. 327, 94 Pac. 390
(1908).
69. Wahle v. Reinbach, 76 Ill. 322 (1875); Radian v. Buckley, 138 Ind.
582, 38 N.E. 53 (1894).
70. Haack v. Lindsay Light & Chem. Co., 325 Ill. App. 581, 60 N.E.2d
578 (1945). It appears by the above decisions that a continuous or recurring injury does not have to be one which is constant and unceasing.
71.

1 Pars. 534

(Pa. 1850), cited approvingly by the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court in Pennsylvania R.R. v. Bogert, 209 Pa. 589, 601, 59 Atl. 100,
105 (1904).

(Emphasis added.)

